FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-1205
ARTHUR OATES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
DISCOVERY ZONE,
Defendant-Appellee.
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois
(Leinenweber, J.)
BRIEF OF THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION AS AMICUS CURIAE
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT
C. GREGORY STEWART
General Counsel
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS
Associate General Counsel
CAROLYN L. WHEELER
Assistant General Counsel
PAULA R. BRUNER
Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
1801 L Street, N.W. Rm. 7044
Washington, D.C. 20507
(202) 663-4731
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii
STATEMENT OF INTEREST. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1. Nature of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
2. Statement of the Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
3. The District Court's Oral Ruling. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
ARGUMENT:
THE DISTRICT COURT MADE LEGAL ERRORS IN GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT FOR DISCOVERY ZONE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
A. The District Court Erred In Dismissing The Claim Of
Racial Harassment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
B. The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment
On The Claim Of Discriminatory Discharge. . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
C. The District Court Erred In Granting Summary Judgment
On The Retaliation Claim. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
ATTACHMENTS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Adler v. Madigan,
939 F.2d 476 (7th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Alexander v. Gerhardt Enter., Inc.,
40 F.3d 187 (7th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .20
Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
13 F.3d 1120 (7th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14, 18
Anderson v. Local 201 Reinforcing Rodmen,
886 F. Supp. 94 (D.D.C. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
Bailey v. Binyon,
583 F. Supp. 923 (N.D. Ill. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Bell v. City of Milwaukee,
746 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Bennett v. Corroon & Black Corp.,
845 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp.,
72 F.3d 326 (3d Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Brooms v. Regal Tube Co.,
881 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power Ass'n,
989 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1993). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Burton v. Crowell Pub. Co.,
82 F.2d 154 (2d Cir. 1936). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union, Allied Indus.
Workers of Am., 959 F.2d 685 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Compston v. Borden, Inc.,
424 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Ohio 1976) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Cox v. NFL,
889 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Daniels v. Essex Group, Inc.,
937 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10
Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co.,
28 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1994). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Doe v. University of Mich.,
721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9, 13
EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp.,
901 F.2d 920 (11th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,
76 F.3d 1155 (11th Cir. 1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc.,
114 S. Ct. 367 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 12
Harris v. School Annual Publishing Co.,
466 So.2d 963 (Ala. 1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Harris v. State,
209 Miss. 141, 46 So.2d 91 (1950) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc.,
45 F.3d 258 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 102 (1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
King v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys.,
898 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Knox v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago,
909 F. Supp. 569 (N.D. Ill. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Landon v. Northwest Airlines, Inc.,
72 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 1995) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Legrand v. Trustees of Univ. of Ark. at Pine Bluff,
821 F.2d 478 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 1034 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico,
864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
McCarthy v. Kempfer Life Ins. Cos.,
924 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1991). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 14, 17
Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 11, 19
Morgan v. McDonough,
540 F.2d 527 (1st Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U.S. 164 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,
490 U.S. 228 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Randle v. LaSalle Telecommun., Inc.,
876 F.2d 563 (7th Cir. 1989). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Rodgers v. Western-Southern Life Ins. Co.,
12 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7, 10, 11
Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Rush v. McDonald's Corp.,
966 F.2d 1104 (7th Cir. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
Shager v. Upjohn Co.,
913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .18
St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
State v. Blanks,
479 N.W.2d 601 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Talley v. Bravo Pittino Restaurant,
61 F.3d 1241 (6th Cir. 1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15
Toletino v. Friedman,
46 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 1995),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2613 (1995). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Troupe v. May Dep't Stores,
20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5, 18
Williams v. Williams Elecs., Inc.,
856 F.2d 920 (7th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17
CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, STATUTES, AND OTHER LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY
U.S. CONST., Art. I § 2 cl. 3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
42 U.S.C. § 2000e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
OTHER AUTHORITY
B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
(Five-Year Cum. Supp. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Courtland Milloy, The Blinding Racism of His Comment, Wash. Post,
Mar. 6, 1996 at C1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 10
George Lawrence, An Oration on the Abolition of the Slave Trade
(N.Y. 1813). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8
Herbert Alptheker, Vol. I A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN THE
UNITED STATES 58 (1951). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or the Life
of One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
259 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10, 13
Larry L. King, CONFESSIONS OF A WHITE RACIST (1969). . . . . . . . . .8, 9
Phyllis A. Katz, TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM (1976). . . . . . . .13
Thomas Kochman, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CONFLICT (1981). . . . . . . .13
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the agency charged
by Congress with
the interpretation, administration, and enforcement of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII") and other federal
statutes prohibiting
employment discrimination. In this case, the district court granted
summary judgment on
plaintiff's claims of discriminatory discharge and retaliation in
violation of Title VII, despite
conflicting evidence on the reason for his discharge. The court also
dismissed his racial
harassment claim without addressing its merits in apparent disregard
of the independent nature a
racial harassment claim under Title VII. The court's dispositions
raise an important issue
regarding how derogatory and racially offensive slurs and conduct,
beyond the use of the
pejorative term "nigger," should be evaluated in the context of
harassment and discharge claims.
Because proper resolution of the claims in this case is important to
effective enforcement of Title
VII, the Commission offers its views.
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Commission adopts the appellant's jurisdictional statement as
accurate and complete.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence of racial harassment to
survive summary judgment,
where plaintiff, the only black employee in his office, complained to
his supervisor that a picture
of gorillas with his name written on it was racially offensive, and
his supervisor laughed at his
complaint, refused to take the picture down, and allowed it to remain
on display for a week after
his complaint.
2. Whether the termination of the company's only black employee four
days after he complained
about a racially offensive poster to his supervisor raised a genuine
issue of fact as to his claims
of discriminatory discharge and retaliation, where record evidence not
only shows that his
supervisor laughed at his complaint, refused to take the poster down,
and participated in the
termination decision, but also that plaintiff's performance may not
have been the true reason for
his discharge.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court's order granting
summary judgment for Discovery
Zone on the discriminatory discharge and retaliation claims and
dismissing the case. R. 53.
2. Statement of the Facts<1>
Arthur Oates, a technical support representative, was responsible
for providing telephonic
support to Discovery Zone FunCenter stores regarding their computer
systems. He was the only
African-American employee at Discovery Zone's office in Rosemont,
Illinois. His immediate
supervisor was Bonnie Christenson. On April 8, 1994, Mark McDermott
became Christenson's
supervisor and assumed responsibility for overseeing the Rosemont
office. The week of April 11,
McDermott met with Christenson and she informed him that she had
contemplated terminating
Oates. Pl. Ex. C, McDermott Dep. at 21, 24, 32.<2>
On Friday, April 15, 1994, Oates met with McDermott at the
Chicago office. Pl. Ex. A,
Oates Dep. at 84; Pl. Ex. C, McDermott Dep. at 25. During this
session, McDermott praised his
job performance. Pl. Ex. A, Oates Dep. at 85. McDermott testified
that after their meeting he
was "impressed" with Oates and considered him "intelligent, very
cordial," with "a lot of
potential." Pl. Ex. C, McDermott Dep. at 30.
In early April, Christenson posted a picture of five gorillas on
a bulletin board located in
the main area of the office. Pl. Ex. A, Oates Dep. at 114. On April
18, Oates saw that his name
had been written above one of the gorillas on the poster. Plaintiff
immediately informed
Christenson that, as an African American, he was offended by the
analogy drawn between him and
the gorilla, and that he considered the inscribed poster to be
racially offensive. Pl. Ex. A, Oates
Dep. at 115. Christenson laughed, id. at 223, and told Oates that he
"was being oversensitive"
and that the poster was "no big deal." Id. at 115. Oates testified
that he felt "embarrassed,
ridiculed, [and] humiliated" by Christenson. Id. at 223. On April 19,
he sent a letter complaining
about the incident via interoffice mail to Mary Mierkiewicz in Human
Resources. Discovery Zone
had no company policy or procedures for redressing harassment
grievances during Oates' tenure.
Pl. Ex. B, Christenson Dep. at 161; Pl. Ex. D, Mierkiewicz Dep. at 17;
Pl. Ex. E, Dublin Dep.
at 64.
On April 21, Oates left a message on Christenson's voice mail
informing her that he was
sick. Discovery Zones' phones went unanswered and Christenson told
McDermott it was because
Oates did not come to work. Pl. Ex. B, Christenson Dep. at 48, 148;
Pl Ex. C, McDermott Dep.
at 38. The next day, Christenson fired Oates, telling him that his
job had been eliminated. Pl.
Ex. A, Oates Dep. at 59. At deposition, McDermott testified, however,
that Oates was terminated
because he failed to follow proper call-in procedures on April 21.
Pl. Ex. C, McDermott Dep.
at 38, 75-76, 83, 85. He also said that, because he had known Oates
for only "a couple of
weeks," he "had to agree with Bonnie [Christenson] that" Oates should
be fired. Id. at 76; see
also id. at 84 (indicating that both McDermott and Christenson made
termination decision).
At deposition, Christenson testified that while she fired Oates,
it was not her decision. Pl.
Ex. B, Christenson Dep. at 23. She claimed Oates was "very
intelligent" and knew software and
hardware very well. She stated that on "numerous occasions" she told
McDermott she "did not
want to fire" Oates, but had discussed Oates' performance with
McDermott often. Id. at 30.
Christenson also testified that the decision to terminate Oates had
been made before Oates' absence
on April 21,<3> and that the decision was not based on Oates' absence
or failure to follow proper
call-in procedures on that day. Id. at 67-68.
On April 25, Mary Mierkiewicz received by interoffice mail Oates'
letter complaining
about the poster and Christenson's reaction. The gorilla poster was
still hanging on that day. Pl.
Ex. B, Christenson Dep. at 36, 157; Pl. Ex. D, Mierkiewicz Dep. at 38.
Oates filed a timely action in the district court against
Discovery Zone, alleging inter alia
racial harassment and retaliatory discharge in violation of Title VII
and discriminatory discharge
in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. R. 21, Second Amended Complaint.
Discovery Zone moved
for summary judgment on the discharge claims. R. 29.
3. District Court's Oral Ruling <4>
Without addressing the merits of Oates' racial harassment claim,
the district court
concluded that Oates did not prove that his discharge was
discriminatory or retaliatory. Citing to
Troupe v. May Dep't Stores, 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994), the
court held that Oates did not
proffer direct evidence of discriminatory intent because Christenson's
reaction to the monkey
poster on which Oates' name was written constituted "stray remarks"
that would not prove Oates'
discharge was discriminatory without reliance on inference or
presumption. In addition, it ruled
that the circumstantial evidence of suspicious timing and ambiguous
comments was insufficient
to create a genuine issue as to whether his supervisor's stray
remarks, rather than his poor
performance, led to his discharge. The court also held that plaintiff
did not prove his
discriminatory discharge claim under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973),
because he did not establish a prima facie case by showing that he was
performing satisfactorily
or that similarly situated employees outside his protected class were
treated more favorably than
he. Finally, the court held that plaintiff did not make out a prima
facie case of retaliation because
he failed to prove Christenson participated in the termination
decision. The court then decided
that even if Oates had established a prima facie case, he did not
offer any evidence showing that
the proffered poor performance reason for the decision to terminate
him was pretextual.
Accordingly, the district court entered summary judgment for Discovery
Zone and dismissed the
case. R. 47.
STATEMENT OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
Review of a district court's decision granting summary judgment
is de novo. Dey v. Colt
Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d 1446, 1453 (7th Cir. 1994). In
determining whether the moving
party has met its burden, all inferences are to be drawn in favor of
the nonmoving party, Toletino
v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.
2613 (1995), and any doubts
are to be resolved against the moving party. Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255
(1986).
ARGUMENT
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT FOR
DISCOVERY ZONE
In its motion for summary judgment, Discovery Zone asserted that
even though the
allegations regarding the monkey poster incident were in dispute,
summary judgment was
appropriate on the discriminatory and retaliatory discharge claims
because Oates' termination was
"made by a person wholly unaware of the alleged 'monkey picture'
incident." R. 30, Def. Summ.
J. Mem. at 2. The district court agreed, entered summary judgment on
both claims, and
terminated the case without specifically addressing the harassment
claim. R. 47. The court erred
in dismissing Oates' case because the record reveals material factual
disputes on his claims of
racial harassment, discriminatory discharge, and retaliatory discharge
rendering summary
judgment inappropriate.
A. The District Court Erred In Dismissing the Racial Harassment Claim
Racial harassment is an independent basis for liability under
Title VII. Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 180 (1989). Race-based conduct
that affects the terms,
conditions, and privileges of employment gives rise to a Title VII
claim of racial harassment if it
is so severe or pervasive that it creates a hostile or offensive
working environment. Rodgers v.
Western-Southern Life Ins. Co., 12 F.3d 668, 673 (7th Cir. 1993);
Daniels v. Essex Group Inc.,
937 F.2d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1991). Such harassment can include
racial slurs, epithets and
comments that, by themselves, violate Title VII if they unreasonably
interfere with an individual's
work performance or create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment. 29
C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(3) (1995).<5> See also Meritor Sav. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67
(1989) (approving Commission guidelines, and noting that "Title VII
affords employees the right
to work in an environment free from discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult"); Rogers
v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) ("discriminatory verbal
intimidation, ridicule and
insults may be sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the
conditions of the victim's employment
and create an abusive working environment that violates Title VII"),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972). To determine liability, the court must consider the totality
of circumstances, Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 371 (1993), and employ both an
objective and a subjective
standard to assess the "'likely effect of a defendant's conduct upon a
reasonable person's ability
to perform his or her work and upon his or her well-being as well as
the actual effect upon the
particular plaintiff bringing the claim.'" Daniels, 937 F.2d at 1270
(quoting Brooms v. Regal
Tube Co., 881 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1989).
In this case, there was sufficient evidence of racial harassment
to raise a genuine issue of
fact as to whether Oates was objectively subjected to a racially
hostile working environment
because the display of the monkey poster with his name on it was, by
itself, actionable harassment,
and that harassment was exacerbated by the supervisor's refusal to
take corrective action. To
begin with, the use of primate imagery, such as gorillas, monkeys, and
apes, to refer to African-
Americans is as offensive as calling a black person a "nigger."
Historically, African-Americans have been considered, referred to
and treated like
subhumans or animals and, out of lack of appreciation of their
culture, were regarded as
uncivilized, and intellectually and culturally inferior.<6> In the
perpetuation of this racial prejudice,
African-Americans have been, and often still are,<7> referred to as
"beasts," "gorillas,<8>" "apes," or
"monkeys." See, e.g., Jeffries v. Metro-Mark, Inc., 45 F.3d 258, 260
(8th Cir.) (racial
harassment suit in which multiple incidents included supervisor
calling black plaintiff a
"monkey"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 102 (1995); Bell v. City of
Milwaukee, 746 F.2d 1205 (7th
Cir. 1984) (civil rights suit allowing testimony of police officer
that he thought black people were
"apes"); Morgan v. McDonough, 540 F.2d 527, 530 (1st Cir. 1976) (civil
rights case challenging
school's inaction towards racial incidents including racial chants by
white students such as
"2,4,6,8 assassinate the nigger apes" and their request to play music
over school address system
because "music soothes the savage beasts"), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
1042 (1977); Cox v. NFL, 889
F. Supp. 118, 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (regarding crowds' verbal abuse
using terms like "nigger"
and "monkey" directed at black football player as based on race); Doe
v. University of Mich., 721
F. Supp. 852, 854 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (race discrimination case
protesting fliers placed around
campus that referred to black persons as "saucer lips, porch monkeys,
jigaboo" and display of
KKK uniform in dorm window); Harris v. State, 209 Miss. 141, 147-48,
46 So.2d 91, 93 (1950)
(describing African American defendant as a "big, black gorilla");
CONFESSIONS OF A WHITE
RACIST at 68 (recounting incident where Texas Tech crowd directed
racial exhortations like "kill
that black ape" at a black football player on the opposing team).
The clear purpose or effect of using racist animal slurs to refer
to African Americans is to
demean, offend, humiliate, or ridicule them. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Local 201 Reinforcing
Rodmen, 886 F. Supp. 94, 95 (D.D.C. 1995) (noting that black employee
alleged he was "hurt"
when his white foreman called him a "mule"); Harris v. School Annual
Publishing Co., 466 So.2d
963 (Ala. 1985) (defamation case in which black school teacher
regarded cartoon of monkey eating
a banana beneath which appeared her name and the inscription "out
munching" as a derogatory
reference "'traditionally used to dehumanize, insult, belittle and
degrade persons of [her] race'")<9>.
Accordingly, a jury could fairly construe a poster inscribed with the
name of the company's only
black employee as a deliberate appeal to racial prejudices, invoking
ridicule, inciting racial
oppression, and generating racial hostility, and conclude therefore
that the gorilla picture created
conditions that would reasonably affect the employment atmosphere,
performance and emotional
well-being of a black employee.
A factfinder could also decide that the facts in this case
support a racial harassment claim
because they are similar to facts in other cases in which this Court
has found harassment. This
Court has held that calling an African American employee a "nigger"
sufficiently alters the
conditions of that worker's employment to support a hostile working
environment claim. See,
e.g., Rodgers, 12 F.3d at 673 (finding credible plaintiff's testimony
that racial remarks, including
use of "nigger," significantly impaired his work performance,
contributed to stress that compelled
him to quit his job and harmed his self-esteem).<10> The adverse and
hostile conditions created by
the initial and continued display of the offensive poster inscribed
with Oates' name are so similar
to those created by the slur "nigger" that the poster incident could
also be viewed as sufficiently
severe or pervasive to constitute actionable harassment. Meritor, 477
U.S. at 67 ("discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult, . . . is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment and create an abusive working environment");
accord Burton v. Crowell
Pub. Co., 82 F.2d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 1936) (defamation case in which
mere association of plaintiff
with gorilla lowered him in others' esteem); State v. Blanks, 479
N.W.2d 601, 602 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1992) (acknowledging that prosecutorial reference to movie
"Gorillas in the Mist" in case
involving black male defendant charged with criminally assaulting his
former white girlfriend has
"racial overtones" and by itself is sufficiently demeaning as to
constitute reversible error).
Further, because the gorilla picture is as offensive as the slur
"nigger," and "nigger" need
only be said once to alter sufficiently the conditions of an African
American employee's work
environment to be actionable harassment, see, e.g., Rodgers, 12 F.3d
at 675 (quoting Meritor,
477 U.S. at 67) ("perhaps no single act can more quickly 'alter the
conditions of employment and
create an abusive working environment,' than the use of an
unambiguously racial epithet such as
'nigger'"); Bailey v. Binyon, 583 F. Supp. 923, 927 (N.D. Ill. 1984)
("use of the word 'nigger'
automatically separates the person addressed from every non-black
person; this is discrimination
per se"), the single incident of the display of the offensive poster
is sufficiently severe to support
a hostile environment claim. See, e.g., King v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Wis. Sys., 898 F.2d
533, 537 (7th Cir. 1990) (stating that even a "single act" of
harassment can be sufficiently severe
to "'alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment"); Bennett v.
Corroon & Black Corp., 845 F.2d 104, 105-06 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding
that the one-time posting
of a cartoon depicting plaintiff in an obscene fashion was sufficient
to support a claim of hostile
environment discrimination), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1020 (1989); B.
SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 90 (Five-Year Cum. Supp. 1989) ("Evidence of a
single egregious racial slur [may be] sufficient to present a triable
issue of fact[.]").
Next, Oates' complaint to his supervisor about the poster with
his name on it and assertions
of mental distress and humiliation caused by the poster's display are
sufficient subjective evidence
that the display of the monkey poster altered the conditions of Oates'
employment and created an
abusive environment. Harris, 114 S. Ct. at 370 (for workplace
environment to be sufficiently
hostile or abusive, victim must subjectively perceive conditions of
employment as abusive);
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 76 F.3d 1155, 1161 (11th Cir. 1996)
(subjective prong of the
harassment standard, i.e. the victim's perception, ensures that the
conditions altered the work
environment).
Finally, even if the display of the inscribed picture by itself
were not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to support a hostile work environment claim, a factfinder
could decide that the
supervisor's conduct of ridiculing Oates and refusing to remove the
poster further poisoned the
environment and altered the terms of Oates' employment enough to
support his harassment claim.
See, e.g., Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F. Supp. 157, 160-61 (S.D.
Ohio 1976) (holding that
a supervisor "vested with managerial responsibilities" is liable under
Title VII when he "embarks
upon a course of conduct calculated to demean an employee" because
"such activity will
necessarily have the effect of altering the conditions of [the
employee's] employment"). A jury
could view Christenson's laughter in response to Oates' harassment
complaint and her retort that
Oates was being "oversensitive,"<11> as a demonstration of racial
insensitivity that is often at the
bottom of prejudices and bigotry that poison the workplace. A
factfinder could also view her
refusal to remove the poster as condoning an abusive and hostile
environment, perpetuating a
racial myth that African Americans are not entirely human or entitled
to be treated with human
dignity, and sending a message to his coworkers that they could
continue to harass Oates with
impunity.
The factfinder could conclude then that Discovery Zone is liable
for racial harassment
because Christenson's knowledge of the harassment and failure to take
remedial action can be
imputed to it. See 29 C.F.R. 1604.11(d). See also Doe, 42 F.3d at
446 ("[k]nowledge of the
agent is imputed to the corporate principal only if the agent receives
the knowledge while acting
within the scope of the agent's authority and when knowledge concerns
a matter within the scope
of that authority"); Chrysler Motors Corp. v. International Union,
Allied Indus. Workers of Am.,
959 F.2d 685, 687-88 (7th Cir.) ("[e]mployers must take all necessary
steps to prevent sexual
harassment in the workplace, such as expressing strong disapproval of
the conduct and developing
appropriate sanctions"), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 908 (1992). Since
there is sufficient evidence of
racial harassment from which a jury could determine that the terms and
conditions of Oates'
employment were adversely affected, and that Discovery Zone is liable
for the harassment, the
hostile environment claim should not have been dismissed by the
district court, but rather should
have gone to a jury.
B. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the
Discriminatory
Discharge Claim
In an employment discrimination action, a plaintiff may prove his
case using direct or
indirect methods of proof. Randle v. LaSalle Telecommunications,
Inc., 876 F.2d 563, 569 (7th
Cir. 1989). Under the direct method, plaintiff must show that the
"decisionmakers placed
substantial negative reliance on an illegitimate criterion in reaching
their decision," Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 277 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), or put differently,
that there is a direct link between the discriminatory intent and the
challenged employment action
sufficient to prove the disputed fact "without reliance upon inference
or presumption." Randle,
876 F.2d at 569. The indirect method, in contrast, permits the
plaintiff to prove intentional
discrimination by making out a prima facie case and by establishing
that either the prohibited
reason more likely than not motivated the adverse employment action or
that the articulated reason
is untrue. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-03
(1973). On a motion for
summary judgment, if plaintiff successfully produces direct evidence
of discriminatory intent or
establishes a prima facie case and produces enough evidence of pretext
from which the factfinder
could infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination, the case
should go to a jury. Anderson
v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120, 1123-24 (7th Cir. 1994)
(summary judgment is
precluded by evidence of prima facie case and pretext); Adler v.
Madigan, 939 F.2d 476, 479 (7th
Cir. 1991) ("'[m]ixed motives' situations are ordinarily not grist for
the summary judgment mill").
Here, the district court erred in deciding that Oates did not
offer enough evidence from
which a factfinder could infer the ultimate fact of intentional
discrimination as to his discharge
under either proof method. In reaching this conclusion, the court
first incorrectly rejected Oates'
argument that Christenson's offensive conduct is direct evidence of
discriminatory intent under
Price Waterhouse. See McCarthy v. Kempfer Life Ins. Cos., 924 F.2d
683, 687 (7th Cir. 1991)
(racial epithets or discriminatory conduct directed at the plaintiff
by an individual closely involved
in the challenged decisional process are direct evidence of
discriminatory animus); Knox v. First
Nat. Bank of Chicago, 909 F. Supp. 569, 572 (N.D. Ill. 1995)
("plaintiff may present direct proof
of discriminatory intent by introducing stray, stereotyped racial
remarks if the remarks are made
by a decisionmaker, are causally related to or have a nexus with the
employment decision at issue,
and are proximately related in time to the employment decision")
(internal citations omitted)<12>.
Oates' evidence of harassment and Christenson's offensive behavior,
which was as severe as
calling an African American a "nigger," are proof of discriminatory
animus because the evidence
is probative of Christenson's discriminatory attitude and the
circumstances which may have
influenced the decision to terminate Oates.
Next, Oates' termination four days after the racial incident
involving Christenson
constitutes "suspicious timing" from which a factfinder could infer a
causal connection between
Christenson's animus and Oates' termination because there is evidence
in the record from which
a jury could conclude that Christenson participated in the termination
decision. McDermott
testified that, starting with his first meeting with her, Christenson
had recommended that Oates
be terminated, they arranged for Oates to be terminated on April 22,
Christenson conducted the
termination meeting, he "agreed" with Christenson to terminate Oates,
and that together they
decided to terminate him. Pl. Ex. C, McDermott Dep. at 25, 32, 73-76,
84-85. Christenson
testified that Oates' termination was not her decision and she had
never recommended Oates'
termination to McDermott. Pl. Ex. B, Christenson Dep. at 23, 30.
While this evidence clearly
raises a factual dispute as to whether she actually participated in
the termination decision,
resolving all doubts in favor of the plaintiff, a jury could conclude
that, since Christenson
admittedly provided the information on which the termination was based
and fired Oates, that she
participated in the termination decision. Id. at 23, 45. Moreover, a
jury could find it implausible
that McDermott alone made the termination decision when he had only
known Oates a couple of
weeks and had formed a favorable impression of him after their initial
meeting. In any event, this
factual dispute defeats summary judgment and is enough to refute the
district court's conclusion
that Christenson's conduct was a "stray remark" made by a nondecisionmaker.
Even if the evidence of Christenson's bias and role in the
termination decision are
insufficient under the Price Waterhouse direct evidence standard,
Oates has produced enough
evidence to survive summary judgment under the indirect proof scheme
of McDonnell Douglas.
The district court reached a contrary conclusion because, in
evaluating Oates' discriminatory
discharge claim, it erroneously took a rigid and mechanical approach
in deciding that Oates did
not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination.
Specifically, the court improperly
considered Discovery Zone's articulated reason for the discharge in
deciding that Oates had not
shown the second element of the prima facie case -- that he was
performing his job satisfactorily.
An employer's assessment of a plaintiff's work is more appropriately
considered in connection
with the pretext stage of proof in a Title VII case. Legrand v.
Trustees of Univ. of Ark. at Pine
Bluff, 821 F.2d 478, 481 n.4 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S.
1034 (1988). The court also
erroneously disregarded Oates' testimony that his performance was
satisfactory, which is sufficient
to meet his prima facie burden. Williams v. Williams Elecs., Inc.,
856 F.2d 920, 923 n.6 (7th
Cir. 1988) ("determination that individual is performing a job well
enough to meet an employer's
legitimate expectations, when made in the context of a prima facie
case, may be based solely upon
the employee's testimony concerning the quality of his work").
Further, the district court erred
in requiring Oates, as the fourth element of the prima facie case, to
prove that similarly situated
employees outside his protected class were treated more favorably than
he because that element
can be satisfied when there is other evidence in the record from which
discrimination could be
inferred, as there was in this case. See Rush v. McDonald's Corp.,
966 F.2d 1104, 1113 (7th Cir.
1992) ("plaintiff may establish a prima facie case of intentional
discrimination by offering evidence
adequate to raise an inference that he was discharged on the basis of
race"); also see Landon v.
Northwest Airlines Inc., 72 F.3d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1995) (identifying
fourth element of prima
facie case as requiring a showing that "there is some evidence that
would allow the inference of
improper motivation"); accord McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 n.13
(noting that "the
specification above of the prima facie proof [the fourth element of
which was evidence that
position denied plaintiff remained open and employer continued to seek
applicants with similar
qualifications] required from respondent is not necessarily applicable
in every respect to differing
factual situations").
In addition to the evidence establishing the prima facie case,
the record contains "other bits
and pieces" of evidence from which an inference of discriminatory
intent might be drawn. Troupe
v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). For
example, Oates proffered
enough pretext evidence to raise a genuine issue as to whether his
performance was the true reason
for his discharge. Discovery Zone asserted that it terminated Oates
because he failed to follow
proper call-in procedures on April 21 to cover his absence from work.
R. 30, Def. Summ. J.
Mem. at 3. According to testimonial evidence in the record, however,
the termination decision
was made before April 21 and therefore was not based on Oates' absence
or failure to follow
proper call-in procedures on April 21. Pl. Ex. B, Christenson Dep. at
68-69; Pl. Ex. D,
Mierkiewicz Dep. at 13; Pl. Ex. E, Dublin Dep. at 15. In addition,
the record also contained
evidence showing that the company gave inconsistent reasons to justify
Oates' termination. Oates
testified that he was told he was being discharged because his job had
been eliminated. Pl. Ex.
A, Oates Dep. at 59. McDermott testified at deposition that Oates was
terminated because he
failed to follow proper call-in procedures. Pl. Ex. C, McDermott Dep.
at 38, 75-76, 83, 85.
Christenson testified that it was not Oates' absence on April 21 or
failure to call-in but rather his
job performance on which his termination was based. Pl. Ex. B,
Christenson Dep. at 68-69.
Making all credibility assessments in favor of Oates, as the district
court and reviewing court must
on a motion for summary judgment, a jury could have inferred from the
contradictory explanations
that none of them were true and instead were offered to cover up a
discriminatory motive.
Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1123-24 (to survive summary judgment, plaintiff
"must only 'produce
evidence from which a rational factfinder could infer that the company
lied' about its proffered
reasons") (quoting Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398, 401 (7th Cir. 1990)).
Evidence in the record also established that the company did not
have an anti-harassment
policy or grievance procedure in place during Oates' employment with
Discovery Zone. Pl. Ex.
A, Oates Dep. at 161; Pl. Ex. D, Mierkiewicz Dep. at 17; Pl. Ex. E,
Dublin Dep. at 64. The lack
of a policy could be viewed as discouraging victims of harassment from
exercising their right to
be in a work environment free from discrimination, cf. Meritor, 477
U.S. at 73 (sexual harassment
policy and grievance procedure should be "calculated to encourage
victims of harassment to come
forward"), and, in light of Christenson's failure to take remedial
action regarding the monkey
poster, be considered evidence of the "corporate culture" in which the
decision to terminate Oates
was made. Cf. Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 333
(3d Cir. 1995) ("a
supervisor's statement about the employer's employment practices or
managerial policy is relevant
to show the corporate culture in which a company makes its employment
decisions and may be
used to build a circumstantial case of discrimination"); Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864
F.2d 881, 907 n.27 (1st Cir. 1988) (noting that, even though defendant
had policy against sex
discrimination, "it had no official grievance procedure to facilitate
the airing of complaints about
such discrimination in an atmosphere of trust and confidence").
Inasmuch as Oates proffered enough evidence to establish a prima
facie case of
discrimination, that evidence combined with his evidence of pretext is
sufficient to raise a genuine
issue of fact as to whether race was the true reason for Oates'
dismissal, and therefore defeat
summary judgment. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 113
S. Ct. 2742, 2749
(1993). Thus, we urge this Court to reverse the district court's
granting of summary judgment
on Oates' discriminatory discharge claim.
C. The District Court Erred in Granting Summary Judgment on the
Retaliation Claim
The district court also erred in granting summary judgment on the
retaliation claim because
the same evidence of pretext and the supervisor's participation in the
termination process proffered
in support of the discriminatory discharge claim is sufficient to
establish a prima facie case and
to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Oates was terminated
for complaining about the
monkey poster or because his employer made "an 'honest assessment of
inadequate performance.'"
Opinion (quoting Alexander v. Gerhardt Enter., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 197
(7th Cir. 1994)).
Therefore, the retaliation claim should have been resolved by a jury.
CONCLUSION
The district court erred in granting summary judgment for
Discovery Zone. The racial
harassment claim raised a genuine issue of fact as to whether Oates
was subjected to a racially
hostile environment. Further, the record contained enough evidence of
racial animus and pretext
that, combined with evidence of the supervisor's participation in both
the racial incident and the
termination decision, would have permitted a rational factfinder to
infer that Oates' termination
four days after the monkey poster incident was either discriminatory
or retaliatory. Therefore,
we urge this Court to reverse the district court's order granting
summary judgment for Discovery
Zone and remand the case for jury consideration.
Respectfully submitted,
C. GREGORY STEWART
General Counsel
PAULA R. BRUNER, Attorney
GWENDOLYN YOUNG REAMS EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
Associate General Counsel COMMISSION
1801 L Street, N.W. Rm. 7044
CAROLYN L. WHEELER Washington, D.C. 20507
Assistant General Counsel (202) 663-4731
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on April 4, 1996, two copies of the foregoing brief
were mailed first class, postage prepaid, to the following counsel of record:
H. Candace Gorman
GORMAN & GORMAN
542 South Dearborn, Suite 1060
Chicago, Illinois 60605
John P. Morrison, Esq.
Joanne L. Hyman, Esq.
BELL, BOYD & LLOYD
Three First National Plaza
70 West Madison Street, Suite 3200
Chicago, Illinois 60602
PAULA R. BRUNER
Attorney
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION
1801 L Street, N.W. Rm. 7044
Washington, D.C. 20507
(202) 663-4731
April 4, 1996
A T T A C H M E N T S
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. Courtland Milloy, The Blinding Racism of His Comment, Wash. Post,
Mar. 6, 1996
2. Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or the Life
of One Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
259 (1993)
A T T A C H M E N T 1
A T T A C H M E N T 2
*******************************
<NOTES>
<1> The record contains disputed facts regarding, inter alia, Oates' work
performance, attendance and adherence to "call-in" procedures when
missing work,
Discovery Zone's reason for Oates' discharge, whether the monkey
poster incident
occurred, whether Oates complained to Human Resources prior to his
termination, and
whether he wrote his own name on the gorilla poster. We present the
facts here in
the light most favorable to Oates, as summary judgment standards
require. The facts
are largely taken from the district court's oral ruling. Record
references have been
provided for facts not appearing in the court's opinion.
<2> R. 38 is the record reference for all of plaintiff's exhibits
which were in the
appendix to his response to defendant's summary judgment motion.
<3> Discovery Zone's human resources managers also testified that they
were aware
Oates was going to be terminated prior to Thursday, April 21, the day
he was absent.
Mierkiewicz said that she knew Oates was going to be terminated a "few
days" before
April 22 and that it was possibly on Tuesday, April 19 or Wednesday,
April 20, that
she learned of this matter.
Pl. Ex. D, Mierkiewicz Dep. at 13. James Dublin said that he found
out "possibly
the week before" but that he was definitely involved in conversations regarding
Oates' termination the week it occurred. Pl. Ex. E, Dublin Dep. at 15.
<4> There are no page references to the transcript of the district court's oral
ruling because it is not paginated.
<5> Although the Commission's guidelines refer to discrimination based
on sex, the
Commission has made it clear that the liability principles governing sexual
harassment and discrimination also apply to race. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
n.1 (1995).
<6> The federal Constitution is illustrative of the subhuman status
accorded African
Americans during slavery because it quantified, for representation
purposes, enslaved
black people as three-fifths of a person. U.S. CONST., Art. I § 2
cl.3. See also
Herbert Alptheker, Vol. I A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE NEGRO PEOPLE IN
THE UNITED
STATES 58 (1951) (quoting George Lawrence, An Oration on the Abolition
of the Slave
Trade (N.Y. 1813)) ("[t]here was a time whilst shrowded in ignorance,
the African was
estimated no higher than beasts of burden").
<7> See, e.g., Courtland Milloy, The Blinding Racism of His Comment,
Wash. Post, Mar.
6, 1996, at C1 (noting that sports analyst Billy Packer's reference to a black
Georgetown basketball player as "a tough monkey" was not only racist
and offensive
to "many African American viewers" but that Packer's response that his
comment had "
'nothing to do with race'. . . reflects the arrogance and denial that are the
cornerstones of racist thinking in America today") (Att. 1).
<8> The association of black people with gorillas has its origins in Christian
theology. As one commentator expressed:
One of the favored topics of those unlettered priests was the vast amount of
Scriptural authority accounting for the black man's lowly state and substandard
conduct. Ham [one of Noah's sons who survived the Great Flood] had
taken a wife
from among a tribe marked by the curse of Cain -- some low-rated beast
of the field
she was, probably little better than a first cousin to the gorilla. From this
unnatural union (so ran the prevailing theology) had been produced the
most primitive
form of the black race.
Larry L. King, CONFESSIONS OF A WHITE RACIST at 18-19 (1969).
<9> Accord Jennifer M. Russell, On Being a Gorilla in Your Midst, or
the Life of One
Blackwoman in the Legal Academy, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 259, 260
(1993) (first
and sole African-American law school female professor's view that picture of a
gorilla found in her school mail box at Case Western University
communicated the
"loud, unambiguous message" that she could "[c]laim no membership to
the human race"
because she was "not even a sub-species" but rather a "brute"
"[a]nimal, not human;"
a "time-worn message communicated to persons who are not white") (Att. 2); The
Blinding Racism of His Comment, Wash. Post at C1 (noting that white
sportscaster
Billy Packer's reference to a black Georgetown basketball player as "a
tough monkey"
is "particularly egregious because of a centuries-old effort to
dehumanize African
Americans by linking them genetically with primates").
<10> See also Daniels, 937 F.2d at 1272-75 (holding that racial
incidents involving
hanging dummy, KKK and racial graffiti, and slurs using "Buckwheat"
and "nigger"
were sufficiently severe and pervasive to support racial harassment claim).
<11> The term "oversensitive" in this context is consistent with a
genre of code
words often used to mask unconscious racism and perpetuate the
racist's denial of,
and arrogance about, the offensiveness of his or her conduct. See
Phyllis A. Katz,
TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 27 (1976) (for a discussion of code
words used to
describe African Americans and their characteristics). Accord On Being
a Gorilla in
Your Midst, 28 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. at 261-62 (when confronted with racial
incidents, "the blackwoman scholar must appear neither hypersensitive
nor paranoid.
Her white male (and female) colleagues will quickly note the
occurrence of facially
similar events involving themselves to discredit what she knows to be
the truth");
Thomas Kochman, BLACK AND WHITE STYLES IN CONFLICT 61 (1981) (because
"in the past
blacks were not even allowed to express and assert themselves to the
extent that
white cultural norms allow, let alone black ones[,] . . . as blacks begin to
experience a greater sense of freedom to express and assert themselves publicly
according to black norms, they find themselves vulnerable again to whites who
consider such behavior excessively emotional and provocative and to which they
respond with incomprehension and violence").
<12> See also Talley v. Bravo Pittino Restaurant, 61 F.3d 1241,
1248-49 (6th Cir.
1995) (racial comments by white managers constituted direct evidence
that plaintiff's
termination was racially motivated); Brown v. East Miss. Elec. Power
Ass'n, 989 F.2d
858, 861 (5th Cir. 1993) (supervisor's routine use of "nigger" is
direct evidence
that racial animus motivated contested employee's discharge); EEOC v.
Alton Packaging
Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 924 (11th Cir. 1990) (evidence of racial
hostility by employer's
general manager, one of persons responsible for denying plaintiff a
promotion, was
direct evidence of discrimination under Price Waterhouse).
